

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 00693 01 OF 03 261129Z
ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 OES-02 ACDA-10 EB-04 H-01 L-01
NSC-06 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 PM-03
INR-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IO-03 EUR-08 /068 W
-----261241Z 050062 /13

R 261015Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9786
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LIMA
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 0693

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TECH, ENRG, PARM, BR, GW
SUBJ: BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR DEBATE: FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS BRAZIL'S
RIGHT TO ITS DESTINY

1. SUMMARY. IN AN OBVIOUS ALLUSION TO THE NUCLEAR QUESTION,
FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA HAS DECLARED THAT BRAZIL WILL NOT
PERMIT ITS DESTINY TO BE "DEFRAUDED OR DISPARAGED BY MISUNDER-
STANDINGS OR FOREIGN INFLUENCES." HE ARGUED THAT THE QUALITY
OF LIFE DEPENDS ON A NATION'S SELF-RESPECT, SELF-FULFILLMENT,
AND AUTONOMY. ONE PRESTIGIOUS NEWSPAPER CALLED SILVEIRA'S
REMARKS "EXTREMELY AGGRESSIVE." AN APPARENTLY AUTHORITATIVE
PRESS BACKGROUNDER MADE CLEAR THAT THE REMARKS WERE
AIMED AT PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER AND OTHER LEADERS OF
THE GREAT POWERS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, SILVEIRA'S REMARKS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 00693 01 OF 03 261129Z

CONFIRMED THE MAIN LINES OF BRAZIL'S IMMEDIATE STRATEGY:
(A) STONEWALL INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES IN PUBLIC, AND
LET WEST GERMANY FEND THEM OFF IN PRIVATE; (B) DISPARAGE
THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF OPPONENTS; AND (C) EXTOL THE CON-
CEPT OF ENERGY AUTONOMY. WE CONSIDER IT PROBABLE THAT,
AT THIS TIME, SOME BRAZILIAN POLICYMAKERS
BELIEVE THIS HARD-LINE STRATEGY WILL ULTIMATELY BE SUCCESS-

FUL IN KEEPING THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT INTACT, ALTHOUGH CONFIDENCE PROBABLY IS LOWER NOW THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE JUNE 1975, AND IT IS FALLING. SILVEIRA'S REITERATION OF BRAZIL'S OPTIMAL POSITION, IN OUR JUDGMENT, CAN ALSO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A BEGINNING POSITION OF APPARENT INTRANSIGENCE SO AS TO ACHIEVE THE BEST POSSIBLE RESULT FROM ANY EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. SILVEIRA'S REMARKS CAME IN A WRITTEN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT A JAN. 13 CEREMONEY WITH CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER JAMIESON. (SEPTTEL DEALS WITH THE JAMIESON VISIT, INCLUDING HIS STATEMENT, MADE ON ARRIVAL IN BRASILIA, THAT CANADIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IS CONTINGENT UPON NPT ADHERENCE OR FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.)

3. BEGIN EXCERPTS OF SILVEIRA'S ADDRESS:

"QUALITY OF LIFE ... SIGNIFIES SELF-RESPECT, SELF-FULFILLMENT, AND AUTONOMY." "SELF-RESPECT SIGNIFIES ... MUTUAL RESPECT, FOR THERE IS NOT ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IT SIGNIFIES THE SINCERE EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS OF THE OTHER PARTY, THE CAPACITY OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION, AND THE CONFIDENCE IN THE ACCOMMODATION OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS TO THOSE OF OTHER PEOPLES."

4. "AS FOR SELF-FULFILLMENT, IT IS THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF ALL PEOPLES. IN THE CASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IT SIGNIFIES MOREOVER THE REACHING OF SUCCESSIVELY HIGHER LEVELS OF PROGRESS WHICH COME NEARER TO THOSE OF LEVELS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 00693 01 OF 03 261129Z

OF MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, THE GREAT DISPARITIES OF MATERIAL PROGRESS CAN BECOME ACCEPTED AS NATURAL BETWEEN PEOPLES ... IN TODAY'S WORLD THE MOST DYNAMIC ELEMENT OF MATERIAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IS TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATIONS REALIZE THAT TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IS AN INSTRUMENT, PERHAPS THE MOST POWERFUL, FOR SOCIAL MANIPULATION, AND THAT IT CAN SERVE THE CAUSE OF HARMONY AMONG PEOPLES JUST AS IT CAN SERVE THEIR DISHARMONY. BRAZIL, A PEACEFUL COUNTRY BY HISTORICAL VOCATION AND BY THE TEMPER OF ITS PEOPLE, DESIRES THAT THE BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY SERVE THE PROGRESS OF ITS PEOPLE AND OF ALL HUMANITY, AND (BRAZIL) CONCEIVES THIS PROGRESS AS PROCEEDING IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE, HARMONY, AND EQUITY."

5. "I SAID ALSO THAT AUTONOMY WAS PART OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE TO WHICH WE ASPIRE. WE ARE A GENEROUS PEOPLE AND OPEN TO DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. BUT WE ARE ALSO A

PEOPLE PROUD OF OUR NATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS, OF HAVING
CONSTRUCTED A UNIFIED SOCIETY WITHOUT PRECONCEPTIONS OF
ANY ORDER, A SOCIETY DIRECTED TOWARD THE CREATION OF
GROWING OPPORTUNITIES FOR GIVING VALUE TO THE HUMAN
PERSON, IN TERMS OF SELF-FULFILLMENT AS WELL AS IN TERMS
OF SOCIAL FULFILLMENT. THIS IS THE DESTINY WHICH WE ARE
FULFILLING. WE WILL NOT PERMIT IT TO BE DEFRAUDED OR
DISPARAGED BY MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR FOREIGN INFLUENCES."
END EXCERPTS FROM SILVEIRA'S ADDRESS.

6. PRESS INTERPRETATION. THE PRESTIGIOUS O ESTADO DE
SAO PAULO (JAN. 14) CALLED THE ADDRESS "AN EXTREMELY
AGGRESSIVE RESPONSE" TO JAMIESON'S ARRIVAL REMARKS ON
THIS SUBJECT. O ESTADO INFERRED THAT "THE UNEXPECTED RE-
ACTION BY SILVEIRA, THROUGH ITS LARGE DOSE OF AGGRESSIVITY,
ELIMINATED TOTALLY THE POSSIBILITIES OF A VOLUNTARY BACK-
DOWN BY BRAZIL ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION." IN AN APPA-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 00693 01 OF 03 261129Z

RENT REFERENCE TO THE ADDRESS, THE JORNAL DE BRASILIA'S
OCTAVIO BONFIM (JAN. 16) QUESTIONED WHETHER BRAZIL OUGHT
TO IRRITATE OR ALARM THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION WITH ANTA-
GONISTIC DECLARATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 00693 02 OF 03 261147Z

ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 OES-02 ACDA-10 EB-04 H-01 L-01

NSC-05 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 PM-03

INR-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IO-03 EUR-08 /067 W

-----261237Z 050247 /11

R 261015Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9787

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY LIMA

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BRASILIA 0693

LIMDIS

7. OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION. AN APPARENTLY AUTHORITATIVE PRESS BACKGROUNDER CARRIED IN O ESTADO ON JAN. 15 LEFT NO DOUBT AS TO SILVEIRA'S INTENT, TARGET, AND AUTHORITY. "DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS IN BRASILIA" (READ THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OR PERHAPS THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE), ACCORDING TO O ESTADO, PRAISED SILVEIRA'S SPEECH AS "MAKING FIRM THE BRAZILIAN POSITION OF REPUDIATING CRITICS AND PRESURES AGAINST THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT." THE OBSERVERS SAID THE SPEECH HAD THE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT GEISEL, AND IT THEREFORE REVEALED THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE "AFFIRMATIVE AND AGGRESSIVE" TEXT HAD BEEN THOUGHT THROUGH CAREFULLY. IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE CLEAR, ACCORDING TO O ESTADO'S VERSION OF THE OBSERVERS' REMARKS, THAT THE GOB WILL "REACT TO THE LIMIT WHENEVER IT IS PRESSURED TO INHIBIT SECTORS ESSENTIAL FOR ITS DECONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 00693 02 OF 03 261147Z

VELOPMENT;" FOR THIS REASON, SILVEIRA'S DECLARATION GAINED THE SUPPORT OF DIVERSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT (READ: THE MILITARY INCLUDED) FOR HAVING AFFIRMED BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENCE AND REPUDIATED "UNJUST" PRESSURES.

8. THE PRINCIPAL TARGET OF THE BRAZILIAN "MESSAGE," ACCORDING TO THE OBSERVEFS CITED IN O ESTADO, IS THE FUTURE US PRESIDENT. THE JAMIESON VISIT FURNISHED A LONG-SOUGHT OPPORTUNITY FOR AN "INCISIVE PRONOUNCEMENT" ON THIS SUBJECT. "A BETTER TIME FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOUND: SEVEN DAYS BEFORE HIS INAUGURATION, CARTER LEARNED OF THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT -- SUPPORTED BY DIVERSE SECTORS OF POLITICAL OPINION (READ: THE OPPOSITION MDB PARTY INCLUDED) AND PUBLIC OPINION -- WILL DEFEND THE AUTONOMY OF THE COUNTRY IN THE NUCLEAR SECTOR. OTHER LEADERS OF THE GREAT POWERS, INCLUDING THE USSR, HAVE LEARNED THE SAME THING."

9. COMMENT. IN OUR JUDGMENT, SILVEIRA'S REMARKS CONFIRM THE MAIN LINES OF WHAT HAS BEEN AND WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO BE BRAZIL'S IMMEDIATE STRATEGY:

-- STONEWALL INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES IN PUBLIC, AND LET WEST GERMANY FEND THEM OFF IN PRIVATE;

-- DISPARAGE THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF OPPONENTS; AND

-- ESTOL THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY AUTONOMY, AND BY IMPLICATION,
THE DANGER OF RELYING ON FOREIGN SUPPLIERS OF ENRICHED
URANIUM.

10. SINCE IT EXPECTS INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES TO FALL
PRINCIPALLY IF NOT WHOLLY ON WEST GERMANY, THE GOB
PROBABLY SEES PUBLIC STONEWALLING AS A RELATIVELY COST-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 00693 02 OF 03 261147Z

LESS TACTIC THAT BRINGS INTERNAL POLITICAL BENEFITS AND
RAISED THE POLITICAL COST TO WEST GERMANY OF ACCEDING TO
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES.

11. DISPARAGING THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF OPPONENTS, OR
ACCUSING THEM OF HYPOCRITICAL DOUBLE-STANDARDS, IS LIKELY
TO CONTINUE TO CONSTITUTE THE PRINCIPAL TACK OF BRAZIL'S
STRATEGY IN THE PUBLIC ARENA. SILVEIRA ARGUED ESSENTIALLY
THAT IT IS IMMORAL FOR OPPONENTS TO TRY: (A) TO USURP
BRAZIL'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL POWER, THEREBY DE-
BASING NATIONAL CHARACTER AND MORALE (I.E., SELF-RESPECT,
ETC.), AND (B) TO THWART BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PRO-
GRESS BY DEPRIVING IT OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS AND HOPES
FOR REACHING GREATER ENERGY AUTONOMY. IN A SENSE, HE
TOOK THE HIGH ROAD; HE MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO
INTERNATIONAL "PRESSURES," OR EVEN TO NUCLEAR ENERGY.
WE CAN EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO SEE LESS ELEVATED
LINES OF ARGUMENT AS WELL. AS THE GOB DID IN RESISTING
PRESSURES TO SIGN THE NPT AND TO ADHERE WITHOUT RESERVA-
TION TO THE TLATELOLCO TREATY, IT MAY OPENLY IMPUGN OPPO-
NENTS AS HAVING ENTIRELY SELFISH AND IMPERMISSIBLE
MOTIVES, E.G., TO FREEZE THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER, TO
GAIN COMMERCIAL BENEFIT. IT WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO
CHALLENGE THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF WHAT BRAZIL SEES AS
TWO SUPERPOWERS LOCKED INTO A DOOMSDAY ARMS RACE YET
PROFESSED TO BE WORRIED ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. THE
CHALLENGE MAKES LITTLE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SUPER-
POWERS. THE HIGH PITCH OF RESENTMENT AGAINST US (AND
USSR) NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES AND TRENDS PROBABLY HAS
REINFORCED THE TREND AMONG BRAZILIAN ELITIES TO PLAY DOWN
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MORA BASES OF THE SUPER-
POWERS' RESPECTIVE WORLD ROLES.

12. THE GOB MAY COME TO PERCEIVE THAT IT COULD HELP
BRAZIL'S (AND THE FRG'S) CASE BY GIVING MORE PUBLIC STRESS TO
BRAZIL'S COMMITMENT TO SAFEGUARDS ON THE ENTIRE BRAZILIAN-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 00693 02 OF 03 261147Z

GERMAN PROGRAM. PERHAPS SOME GOB OFFICIALS IN THE NUCLEAR AREA RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOB HAS NOT EMPHASIZED THIS COMMITMENT SUFFICIENTLY IN PUBLIC. ALSO, THEY MAY BELIEVE THAT, IF WEST GERMANY WERE TO NEED HELP FROM BRAZIL TO BOLSTER THE DEFENSE OF THE AGREEMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES, THE FRG WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOB TO PUBLICIZE BRAZIL'S SAFEGUARDS COMMITMENTS, AND PERHAPS TO ADD TO THEM (E.G., FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS IN RETURN FOR PRESERVING THE TRANSFER OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES). AT THE PRESENT TIME, HOWEVER, WE SEE NO SHIFTS IN THE GOB'S STANCE ON THE IMMEDIATE HORIZON, ALTHOUGH CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE GOB OF THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A SHIFT MIGHT POSSIBLY LEAD TO ONE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO VIEW PRESIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 00693 03 OF 03 261208Z
ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 OES-02 ACDA-10 EB-04 H-01 L-01
NSC-05 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 PM-03
INR-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IO-03 EUR-08 /067 W
-----261236Z 050501 /11

R 261015Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9788
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LIMA
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BRASILIA 0693

LIMDIS

GEISEL'S EXTEMPORANEOUS COMMENT TO REPORTERS THAT BRAZIL DOES NOT WANT AN ATOMIC BOM AS CONSTITUTING MUCH RE-

ASSURANCE -- THE COMMENT WAS NOT A SOLEMN PLEDGE OF THE GOVERNMENT, NOR DID IT RULE OUT ALL EXPLOSIVES. (BRASILIA 612, NOTAL) UP TO NOW, THE GOB HAS AVOIDED MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO REAFFIRM ITS SAFEGUARDS COMMITMENTS. FOR INSTANCE, WHEN IN SEPTEMBER 1975 FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA TESTIFIED BEFORE BRAZILIAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT, HE ACCENTUATED THAT SAFEGUARDS IN THE AGREEMENT DID NOT APPLY TO OR LIMIT IN ANY WAY BRAZIL'S "FREEDOM OF ACTION" IN PROGRAMS UNRELATED TO THE AGREEMENT (75 BRASILIA 8267). (THE LESS NATIONALIST MINES AND ENERGY MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY, SHIGEAKI UEKI, DID HOWEVER STRESS SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS IN HIS TESTIMONY (75 BRASILIA 8617).) SINCE THEN, GOB OFFICIALS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 00693 03 OF 03 261208Z

HAVE ON OCCASION REFERRED TO BRAZIL'S "MODEL" SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT (I.E., ENCOMPASSING TECHNOLOGY). BUT, FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL POLITICS AND, PRESUMABLY, INTERNAL POWER RELATIONSHIPS, THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION THUS FAR HAS PUT LITTLE EMPHASIS ON SAFEGUARDS IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

13. DO BRAZILIANS THINK THE STRATEGY WILL SUCCEED IN HELPING TO KEEP THE GERMAN AGREEMENT INTACT? WE JUDGE THAT AT THIS TIME SOME, POSSIBLY MANY DO, INCLUDING POLICYMAKERS, ALTHOUGH CONFIDENCE PROBABLY IS LOWER NOW THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE JUNE 1975, AND FALLING. FEEDING THE CONFIDENCE IS THE COCKY AND OCCASIONALLY DISDAINFUL FEELING OF SOME BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, AT LEAST AFTER A PERIOD IN OFFICE, WILL BE MORE "PRAGMATIC" THAN WAS GOVERNOR CARTER DURING THE CAMPAIGN. COMMON LINES OF REASONING ARE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL REALIZE BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO THE US, AND WILL WISH NOT TO ANTAGONIZE WEST GERMANY GIVEN NATO'S CURRENT SITUATION. ALSO HELPING TO PRESERVE CONFIDENCE IS THE PROBABLE VIEW OF SOME KNOWLEDGEABLE POLICYMAKERS THAT THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS INTERNAL CONTRADICTION IN ANY US POSITION THAT SOUGHT TO DENY THE TRANSFER OF ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY, BUT THAT WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOR A POLITICALLY-AND INDUSTRIALLY-GUARANTEED SUPPLY OF US ENRICHED URANIUM. SUCH A CONTRADICTION, ACCORDING TO THIS PERCEPTION, WOULD WEAKEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US POSITION IN THE EYES OF OTHER SUPPLIERS AND CONSUMERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, BRAZILIAN CONFIDENCE HAS PROBABLY DECLINED AS BRAZILIANS HAVE COME TO APPRECIATE THAT THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION IS ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S HIGHEST PRIORITIES, AND THAT MANY OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS) ALSO ARE GIVING GREATER ATTENTION TO THIS SUBJECT, OR HAVE CHANGED THEIR NUCLEAR COOPERATION POLICIES. ALSO, A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL BRAZILIANS SEE PRESIDENT CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SIGN THAT HE WILL NOT SHRINK FROM "COERCION" AND "INTER-

REFERENCE IN INTERNAL SUBJECTS," A CATEGORY WHICH INCLUDES, IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 00693 03 OF 03 261208Z

THE SPECIAL BRAZILIAN DEFINITION, THE NUCLEAR QUESTION.
FINALLY, THERE IS AN EVIDENT APPREHENSION THAT WEST GERMANY
WOULD HAVE TO ACCEDE TO STRONG US PRESSURES, REGARDLESS OF THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE AGREEMENT'S SIGNATORIES (A THEME STRESSED BY
BRAZILIANS).

14. DOES THE HARD-LINE STRATEGY DESCRIBED ABOVE REPRESENT AN
ABSOLUTELY FIRM BRAZILIAN POSITION, OR AN OPENING BARGAINING
POSITION OF APPARENT INTRANSIGENCE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE BEST
POSSIBLE RESULT FROM ANY EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS? WE CANNOT CONFIRM
EITHER INTERPRETATION. OR JUDGMENT IS THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME,
THERE ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE POLICYMAKERS WHO CONSIDER THAT SILVEIRA'S
STATEMENT REALLY CAN BE NOTHING MORE THAN A BARGAINING POSITION
UNTIL AND UNLESS THE FRG SHOWS A DETERMINATION TO RESIST INTER-
NATIONAL PRESSURES. OTHER GOB ELEMENTS (AND MUCH OF THE PUBLIC),
HOWEVER, PROBABLY SEE THE STATEMENT SIMPLY AS A REAFFIRMATION OF
WHAT HAS BEEN BRAZIL'S POLICY ALL ALONG--A POLICY THAT WEATHERED
US PRESSURES IN THE SUMMER OF 1975 AND THAT HAS PERSISTED SINCE.
IN SUM, THERE MAY NOT BE A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE GEISEL
ADMINISTRATION. THIS POSSIBILITY MAY MAKE IT HARD FOR "REALISTS"
TO SELL ANY EVENTUALLY NECESSARY FALL-BACK POSITIONS TO POWERFUL
HARD-LINERS ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. ALL ELEMENTS ARE, IN ANY
EVENT, UNDOUBTEDLY CONSCIOUS THAT A SIGNIFICANT RETREAT WOULD
UNDERCUT AN EXTENSIVELY PROPAGANDIZED, WIDELY POPULAR CENTERPIECE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE REVOLUTION'S FOREIGN POLICY.
CRIMMINS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 26-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BRASIL00693
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770028-0387
Format: TEL
From: BRASILIA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770118/aaaaapgy.tel
Line Count: 419
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f93608d1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3500737
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR DEBATE: FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS BRAZIL'S RIGHT TO ITS DESTINY
TAGS: TECH, ENRG, PARM, BR, GE
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f93608d1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009